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BEE V. GREAVES: A PRETRIAL DETAINEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS UNDER
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Howard Bee was forcibly medicated with Thorazine' while
held as a pretrial detainee in the Salt Lake County Jail. Bee subse-
quently filed an action for damages against various members of the jail
staff, alleging violations of several constitutional rights. 2 The federal
district court in Utah ruled against Bee's claims, granting the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. In Bee v. Greaves, 3 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found that pretrial detainees possess a
fundamental constitutional right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic medi-
cation. The court further held that only in emergency situations will a
pretrial detainee's fundamental rights be outweighed by the interests of
the state in maintaining jail safety and security.
The forced medication of a pretrial detainee with Thorazine brings
into issue a host of constitutional bases for both the protection of an
individual's rights and the competing governmental interests which may
limit this protection. The rights embodied in the constitutional con-
cepts of due process, right to privacy, and freedom of thought and
speech meet in Bee to form a conflux of fundamental constitutional pro-
tection. This protection of an individual's rights is subsequently
weighed against governmental interests which flow from a state's duty to
prevent individuals from harming themselves or others while in confine-
ment. This comment will outline the case law background pertinent to
Bee, evaluate the level of protection afforded Bee, and will focus upon
the difficulties with these protections within the context of the Tenth
Circuit opinion.
I. FACTS
Daniel H. Bee was booked into the Salt Lake CountyJail on August
9, 1980. 4 Four days later, Bee was referred by the jail staff to the mental
health staff because he was hallucinating. On August 15, 1980, Bee
1. "Thorazine" is the brand name for chlorpromazine, a "psychotropic" drug or
tranquilizer. Because psychotropic drugs are much more potent than standard tranquiliz-
ers, they are frequently used to control major psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia
and psychosis. T. BAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA: A PSYCHO-PHARMACOLOGICAL APPROACH 3 (1972).
See infra note 10.
2. See infra text accompanying note 14.
3. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985). This action
was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides a federal remedy for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
4. Thorazine and Valium were specified in the booking sheet as Bee's required medi-
cation. Brief for Lake County Appellees at 3, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.
1984).
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complained of not receiving Thorazine and threatened suicide if not
provided with the drug. Bee was placed in isolation and evaluated by jail
psychiatrist Dr. Robert Greer. At the same time, Dr. Keith Greaves, the
jail physician, prescribed Thorazine for Bee. On August 26, the jail sent
Bee to the Utah State Hospital for an evaluation of his competency to
stand trial. Breck Lebegue, a physician, diagnosed Bee as schizo-
phrenic. 5 Bee was prescribed Thorazine by Dr. Lebegue and then re-
turned to jail on September 23.6 Dr. Lebegue subsequently wrote a
letter to the state trial court rendering his opinion that Bee was compe-
tent to stand trial. 7 The next day, the state court found Bee competent
to stand trial.8 The court ordered Bee medicated with Thorazine each
evening while awaiting trial. 9
On October 7, Bee, who had been taking Thorazine voluntarily,
complained of problems he was having with the medication.' 0 Nine
days later he refused to take Thorazine for a five-day period. Dr. Greer,
a jail psychiatrist, testified that Bee was "decompensating" as a result.
Dr. Greer then issued an order stating that Bee was to be forcibly medi-
cated any time he refused the Thorazine treatment.' 2 On October 21,
three jail officers and a jail medic forcibly injected Bee with Thorazine
for the purpose of "intinmidat[ing] him so he wouldn't refuse the oral
medication any more."' 3 Two days later, when Bee again refused the
medication, he was threatened with forced injections. Under the threat,
Bee acquiesced and took Thorazine orally. For at least three weeks fol-
lowing his initial refusal, the jail staff remained under a standing order
to medicate Bee forcibly should he again refuse treatment. Bee contin-
5. 744 F.2d at 1389. Schizophrenia is a medical term describing a group of disorders
characterized by multiple personalities, delusions, hallucinations, or certain other distur-
bances in thought forms. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 181-93 (3d ed. 1980).
6. 744 F.2d at 1389. Dr. Lebegue determined that Bee was mentally ill while in an
unmedicated condition and that he was threatening, violent, and hallucinating without
treatment. Dr. Lebegue also observed that in a medicated state Bee "normalized:" he had
improved thought processes, decreased incidences of violent behavior, and fewer halluci-
nations. Id.
7. 744 F.2d at 1389.
8. The state psychiatrists were of the opinion that Bee would require continued
Thorazine treatment in order to maintain his competency to stand trial. Brief for Lake
County Appellees at 4-5, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
9. Although not explicitly stated, it is possible to infer from the facts that Bee was
medicated with Thorazine during his competency hearing. Brief for Lake County Appel-
lees at 5, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
10. There is significant evidence suggesting that Thorazine and other antipsychotic
drugs often produce severe side-effects in patients continually administered these medica-
tions. These side-effects include psuedo-parkinsonisms, a mask-like face, tremors, muscle
stiffness, and rigidity. Other side-effects are muscle spasms in the face, writhing and gri-
macing movements, protrusions of the tongue, drowsiness, weakness, dizziness, fainting,
dry mouth and blurred vision. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 928-29 (N.D. Ohio
1980); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980
Wis. L. REV. 497, 530-39.
11. "It is unclear from the record what 'decompensating' means." 744 F.2d at 1389
n. 1. The term decompensating implies some sort of violent behavior, although there is
conflicting evidence as to the extent Bee was a threat to himself or others in the jail. Id.
12. Id. at 1390.
13. Id. at 1390 (quoting Record vol. III, Hughes Deposition at 24).
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ued taking Thorazine orally as a result of this prolonged intimidation.
Bee then brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. He alleged infringement of his right to privacy, his
due process rights under the fourteenth amendment, and his rights to
free speech and thought.
14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Foundation of Individuals' Rights
1. Substantive Due Process and the Right to Privacy
Although first applied by the Supreme Court solely in the context of
economic regulation, the due process clause has developed in the last
few decades as one of several substantive bases for the protection of
personal rights.15 Because the issue is usually the extent to which the
government may intrude into such personal areas of protection, the
Court has simultaneously sought to balance these personal rights
against legitimate governmental interests. In his frequently-cited dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan summarized this test: "Due process
has not been reduced to any formula; . . . [it represents] the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society."' 6 The right to privacy is one of the personal interests which
the Supreme Court has afforded due process protection.
According to the Supreme Court, the right to privacy is "one aspect
of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 7 The fourteenth amendment is not the only source of
the right to privacy. The right stems from various other constitutional
guarantees which, combined, create personal "zones of privacy."' 18
Although no exact definition of the right to privacy can be given due to
14. Id. at 1389-90.
15. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 890-96 (1978).
16. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
18. "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Such "emanations" stem from the first amendment (right of
association), fourth amendment (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures), fifth
amendment (freedom from testifying against oneself), and the ninth amendment ("The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people."). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 484; see also Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1
(1978); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). One socio-
logical basis for the right to privacy concept is the essays and philosophy of John Stewart
Mill:
There is a circle around every individual human being, which no government.
ought to be permitted to overstep; there is a part of the life of every person who
has come to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person
ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collec-
tively. That there is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus en-
trenched around and sacred from authoritative intrusion, no one who professes
the smallest regard to human freedom or dignity will call in question.
1986]
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the amorphous nature of its origins, it is clear that, throughout its evolu-
tion, the right has been applied only in the context of marriage or fam-
ily, education, travel, and procreation.' 9 Attempts have been made,
however, to extend the right to privacy to other fact situations beyond
these four traditional areas.2 0 When the right is invoked the balancing
process utilized compares the individual privacy interest with the com-
peting state interests.
In addition to perfecting a working model of the right to privacy,
and providing the nucleus for the modern abortion controversy, Roe v.
Wade21 represents a definitive example of how the Supreme Court bal-
ances fundamental individual rights against compelling state interests.
The Court in Roe held that as a fetus grows older and more mature, the
state has an increasing interest in deciding whether or not abortion is
proper.2 2 Thus, Roe provides an excellent illustration of the willingness
of the Court, in implementing its balancing process, to override a funda-
mental right through the recognition of a compelling state interest.
2 3
2. Freedom From Bodily and Mental Restraint
One basic value developed by the Supreme Court in interpreting
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is a person's free-
dom from bodily restraint. This right to be free from unjustified intru-
J. S. MILL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 560-61 (1848).
19. Representative of the evolution of the right to privacy, its substantive due process
origins, and the characteristic individual/state interest balancing process are: Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (the right to study the German language outweighs
state interests of homogenization of American ideals; the due process clause protects the
right of an individual to contract, to engage in the occupation of his choice, to learn, to
marry, establish a home, raise children and to worship God); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (no state power to "standardize... children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(fundamental right to marriage and procreation prohibits sterilization of habitual male
criminals in spite of valid state interest in controlling crime); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (individual's right to travel outweighs governmental interest of
controlling communist activities); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to
privacy protects individual's ability to have access to and use contraceptives).
20. In Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984), the Court noted
that relationships characterized by "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in deci-
sions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship" are entitled to the same right of privacy protections as a family. How-
ever, the Court concluded that because theJaycees did not possess all of these characteris-
tics, they were not entitled to such protections. See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (Court rejected attack on California's statutory rape law, finding no right
of privacy protection for sexual behavior among consenting minors); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977) (although privacy interests include avoidance of disclosure of personal
matters and the making of certain important decisions, patients do not have a right to
privacy protecting physician-patient confidentiality); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (no right to privacy regarding homosexual lifestyle); Kelley v. John-
son, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (no right to privacy protecting a policeman's personal appear-
ance); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 683, 713 (1976) (no fundamental right to privacy protecting
public dissemination of one's name in a negative context). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
15, at 887-957.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. Id. at 162-64.
23. See Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substan-
tive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 628 (1973).
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sions on personal security is limited by various legitimate societal
interests which are given effect through application of Justice Harlan's
Poe v. Ullman balancing test.
24
The landmark decision of Rennie v. Klein (Rennie 1)25 extended the
application of the right of personal security from bodily restraint to the
mentally ill.26 Rennie was a 40-year-old mental patient forcibly treated
with antipsychotic drugs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found
that forced medication was an intrusion "rising to the level of a liberty
interest warranting the protection of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment."' 2 7 This right was not treated as absolute. Rather,
the protection from bodily intrusions was balanced against the state's
interest in preventing Rennie from endangering himself and others. 28
Additionally, in Rennie I the Third Circuit applied, as the appropriate
standard of review, the "less intrusive means test."'29 Under this test
"[tihe means chosen to promote the state's substantial concerns must be
be carefully tailored to effectuate those objectives with minimal infringe-
ment of protected interests."
'30
Subsequent to Rennie I, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 3 1 the Supreme Court
considered for the first time the substantive rights of involuntarily com-
mitted mentally retarded persons restrained against their will.3 2 Citing
Vitek v. Jones,3 3 the Court found that committed mentally retarded pa-
tients retain certain liberty interests under the fourteenth amendment.
In addition to the undisputed rights to food, shelter, clothing and medi-
cal care, the Court concluded that the patients possess rights of safety,
freedom of movement, and liberty from bodily restraint. The Court
stated that these patients retain the right to freedom from bodily re-
straint because this interest "survives criminal conviction and incarcera-
tion . . . it must also survive involuntary commitment."'3 4 Again, the
24. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673 (1977) (school's corporal punishment policy upheld as a valid disciplinary method in
the face of children's assertions of right to freedom from excessive punishment); Cf
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (action brought by inmates of a state prison alleging violation
of due process rights: "liberty from bodily restraint always has been protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action").
25. Rennie I, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 119
(1982) (in light of Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)),
reinstated and modified on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (Rennie II).
26. The right to be free from bodily intrusions is treated by the court precisely the
same as the right to be free from bodily restraint. Rennie 1, 653 F.2d at 843-45.
27. Id. at 844.
28. This power flows from a state's police power and the parens patriae theory. Id. at
845 (citing Colls v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976)).
29. 653 F.2d at 845.
30. Id. at 846.
31. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
32. Youngberg is factually distinguishable from Rennie and Bee in that the state action in
Youngberg did not involve medication. Id. at 315.
33. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, a convicted felon was transferred from a state
prison to a mental health hospital under the authority of a state statute. The Court recog-
nized that a prisoner is entitled to the procedural due process protection of a hearing prior
to being transferred to a mental hospital.
34. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
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Court reiterated that these liberty interests are "not absolute."' 35 The
state is entitled to balance against these individual interests the compet-
ing interests of operating mental health institutions in a manner which
protects the patients from themselves and others.
36
Turning to a discussion of the appropriate level of judicial review,
the Court, refusing to follow Rennie I,37 declined to adopt the "less in-
trusive means" standard. Instead, the Court adopted the modem gov-
erning standard of review for the conduct of states when dealing with
the mentally infirm: "Liability may be imposed only when the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from the accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment. 3 8
At least one court has noted that this right of freedom from bodily
restraint extends to protection from mental restraint as well. In Project
Release v. Prevost,3 9 a state mental patient challenged the constitutionality
of statutorily authorized commitment and treatment procedures. In
holding that the specific commitment procedures did not violate due
process, the court stated that "[f]orcible medication can alter mental
processes and limit physical movement, and therefore is analogous to
bodily restraint."
40
Thus, the Supreme Court has developed a constitutional right,
under the due process clause, of freedom from bodily restraint. This
right does not exist in a vacuum; it is circumscribed by competing state
interests. In reviewing these decisions, the appropriate level of review
employed by courts in light of Youngberg is the "professional judgment"
standard.
4 1
3. First Amendment Protections
Justice Cardozo, writing in Palco v. Connecticut,4 2 a case primarily in-
volving the fourteenth amendment, paused in dicta to comment on the
freedom of thought and speech described most prominently in the first
amendment: "Of that freedom [of thought and speech] one may say it is
the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
35. Id. at 321.
36. Id. at 320-21. The Court once again, by balancing the liberty interest of the indi-
vidual against the demands of organized society, relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961). See supra text accompanying note 16.
37. See Rennie 1, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text. As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Younberg v. Romeo, the Third Circuit in
Rennie II adopted the "professional judgment" standard; however, this greater level of
deference to the state interests failed to warrant a reversal. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266
(3d Cir. 1983) (Rennie I1).
38. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
39. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), af'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
40. 551 F. Supp. at 1309.
41. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also Comment, Constitutional Rights of the
Involuntarily Committed Mentally Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 1113
(1983).
42. 302 U.S. 316 (1937).
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freedom." 4 3
Freedom of thought and speech was first applied to the forced med-
ication of a mental patient in Scott v. Plante.44 As well as addressing the
protections available under the fourteenth amendment, the Third Cir-
cuit held that forced treatment amounts to a violation of a mental pa-
tient's first amendment rights. 4 5 The federal district court's opinion in
Rogers v. 0kin 46 similarly recognized the applicability of the first amend-
ment to forced medication cases. Rogers involved a class action attacking
the policies of non-emergency forced medication and involuntary seclu-
sion at a state mental health facility. Finding that the first amendment
provided a basis for the right to privacy, the district court held that the
"protected right of communication presupposes a capacity to produce
ideas." '4 7 Moreover, the court acknowledged that psychotropic medica-
tion interferes with an individual's capacity for thought, and, as such,
infringes upon this fundamental right: "The right to produce a thought
- or refuse to do so - is as important as the right protected in Roe v.
Wade to give birth or abort. . . . Realistically, the capacity to think and
decide is a fundamental element of freedom." '48 Thus, the scope of the
first amendment protections has been held by lower courts to include
freedom of thought as well as speech.
To summarize, there is a group of constitutional protections avail-
able to an individual who has been medicated against his or her will.
Whether labeled "liberty interest," "right to privacy," "freedom from
bodily and mental restraint" or "freedom from thought-control," this
constitutional protection provides a shield for all persons - free, invol-
untarily committed, or incarcerated - from unjustified state infringe-
ments. However, this shield is often legitimately pierced by compelling
state interests. Courts have sought to balance these competing interests
in an effort to serve the needs of both society and the individual.
43. Id. at 327. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.").
44. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 946. See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (prisoners'
alleged receipt of "fright drug" without consent raised possibility of cruel and unusual
punishment or impermissible tinkering with mental processes); Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973), ex-
cerpted in 2 PRIsoN L. REP. 433 (1973) (adult, or his legal guardian if the adult is involunta-
rily detained at a state mental facility, cannot give truly informed consent to experimental
psychosurgery).
46. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), a ff'd in part and revd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
47. 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
48. Id. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (although re-
jecting the first amendment as a basis for protection, the court acknowledged the ability of
antipsychotic drugs to impede an individual's thought processes). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, at § § 15-7, 15-8; Comment, The First Amendment Right to Freedom of Thought as
Applied to Involuntarily Committed Patient's Right to Refuse Drugs, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 973
(1982).
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B. Development of the Constitutional Protections of Pretrial Detainees
1. The Rights Retained by Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees
In Bell v. Wolfish, 49 the Supreme Court stated that pretrial detainees
-retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed
by convicted prisoners."' 50 However, this is not to say that a pretrial
detainee possesses "the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated in-
dividual."' 5 1 In Bell, several inmates of a New York pretrial detention
center brought a class action suit alleging that the overcrowded and un-
derstaffed conditions of the center violated their constitutional rights.
52
The Court found that because no fundamental rights were involved in
the detainee's allegations, the only issue was whether the facility condi-
tions amounted to "punishment" of the detainees. 53 In order to resolve
this issue, the Court first investigated the extent to which the restrictions
or conditions were imposed for purposes other than those stated and,
then, whether such restrictions were excessive in relation to their pur-
poses.54 Further, the Court outlined the standard of judicial review to
be implemented: whether or not the condition or restriction at issue is
"reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective."'5 5 If such a
condition is "arbitrary or purposeless." courts should infer that the
measure is punitive, thereby surpassing legitimate government objec-
tives.5 6 "Wide ranging deference" was accorded the prison officials and
their policies in the absence of evidence that a particular restriction was
an "exaggerated" response to the problem. 57 The Court concluded
that all of the alleged violations were reasonably related to valid govern-
mental objectives.
58
Thus, the Court has fashioned a "reasonable relation" standard to
be employed in evaluating possible breaches of the non-fundamental con-
49. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
50. Id. at 545. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the Supreme Court held that
prisoners retain certain liberty interests, under the due process clause, in freedom from
involuntary transfer from prison to a state mental hospital. In Wolf v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Court held that prisoners retain certain limited procedural due pro-
cess protections in prison administrative procedures affecting them such as loss of "good
time" credits due to misconduct. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
51. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
52. Violations of rights under the first, fourth, fifth and eighth amendments were al-
leged by the pretrial detainees. Other alleged constitutional violations included: "'undue
length of confinement, improper searches, inadequate recreational, educational, and em-
ployment opportunities,. . . and objectionable restrictions on the purchase and receipt of
personal items and books." Id. at 527.
53. Id. at 535-36. Justice Rehnquist stated that under the due process clause of both
the fourteenth and fifth amendments, "a detainee may not be punished prior to adjudica-
tion of guilt." Id. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 n.40, 674 (1977)).
54. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
55. Id. at 539.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 547-48.
58. The most important governmental interest is detention center security:
'[Clentral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal se-
curity within the corrections facilities themselves.' " Id. at 546-47 (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. at 823).
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stitutional rights of pretrial detainees. Courts are instructed to focus
their inquiry upon the punitive intent, or lack of punitive intent, behind
prison actions and restrictions when dealing with pretrial detainees.
C. The Constitutional Rights of Mental Health Patients
The constitutional rights of mental health patients stem mainly
from the interaction of the fourteenth and the first amendments. 59
Courts have recognized a right to refuse treatment grounded in the
right to privacy, which is derived from the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 60 The fourteenth amendment has also been
held to protect a mental health patient's right to freedom from bodily
restraint.6 1 Further, in Rennie v. Klien,62 this freedom was held to be
applicable to mental patients who are medicated against their will. The
second basis for a mental patient's constitutional right to be free from
forced treatment is the first amendment right to freedom of expression.
Both Scott v. Plante63 and Rogers v. Okin 6 recognized the first amend-
ment violations inherent in forced medication.
Thus, courts have allowed mental health patients the constitutional
right to be free from both unwanted treatment and bodily intrusions. As
set forth in the discussion of Rennie v. Klein,65 these rights are limited by
the legitimate state interests of controlling the mentally ill and of pro-
tecting the mentally ill from violence to themselves and others. Addi-
tionally, courts will balance the patient's interests with those of the state
when inquiring into possible violations of constitutional protections.6 6
59. These amendments encompass the right to privacy and the right to freedom of
thought and mental processes, respectively.
60. See Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (mental patients have
constitutional rights not to receive treatments such as lobotomy, electro convulsive treat-
ment, or "adverse reinforcement conditioning"), afd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderbolt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973), excerpted in 2 PRISON L. REP. 433 (1973)
(right to free choice in deciding whether to undergo experimental medical procedures).
61. See discussion of Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), supra notes 31-38 and accompa-
nying text.
62. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rennie 1). See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text.
63. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976). See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979). See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
65. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rennie I). See supra notes 25-29, 37 and accompany-
ing text.
66. See Rennie 11, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983), discussed supra note 37. Interestingly,
many of these constitutional issues were brought together in a federal district court case
involving mental patients and compulsory use of psychotropic drugs. In Davis v. Hub-
bard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the court stated that, although some courts had
derived the right to refuse treatment from "the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment,
as well as the 'penumbras' and 'shadows' of these and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ments," it believed that "the source of the right can be best understood as substantive due
process, or phrased differently, as an aspect of 'liberty' guaranteed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 929. Three interests were found to be in-
volved in forced use of psychotropic drugs: the interest in "bodily integrity," the interest
in making independent decisions, and the interest in being able to think and communicate
freely. Id. at 930. After an extensive analysis, the court concluded that the legitimate state
interests of protecting a patient from harming himself or others did not outweigh the indi-
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Any constitutional infringement must meet the "least intrusive means"
standard.
III. THE CASE
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding issues of material fact,
reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants and
remanded Bee for further proceedings. 6 7 The court employed a two-
tiered analysis, focusing on the issue of whether pretrial detainees have
a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
68
The first task before the court was to determine the sources, if any, of
Bee's constitutional protections. The second consideration by the court
involved weighing these alleged constitutional protections against legiti-
mate competing state interests.
6 9
Judge Seymour, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, began
by analyzing Bee's claimed rights under Roe v. Wade.70 The court deter-
mined that an individual possesses a constitutionally protected "privacy
interest" in deciding whether or not to accept treatment by potentially
dangerous drugs. 7 1 The court based its determination on the tradi-
tional rights analysis, finding that an individual's right to refuse treat-
ment is important enough to fall within the zone of interests protected
by the right to privacy.
72
The Tenth Circuit reinforced this finding by uncovering a separate
liberty interest protection within the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 73 Relying on Youngberg v. Romeo 74 and Project Release
v. Prevost,75 the court reasoned that if incarcerated individuals retain a
liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint, then the same individu-
als, afortiori, have a liberty interest in freedom from mental restraint of
the kind imposed upon them by antipsychotic drugs. 76 The court con-
tinued its due process analysis by drawing an analogy between Bee's sit-
uation and Vitek v. Jones,77 in which the Supreme Court held that even a
convicted prisoner retains due process rights, both substantive and pro-
cedural, prior to being subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatment.
78
vidual's fundamental interests. Thus, procedural measures safeguarding the right and
ability to consent were enforced. Id. at 937-38.
67. 744 F.2d at 1397.
68. Id. at 1391.
69. Id. at 1392.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. Judge Sey-
mour also relied extensively on Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
discussed supra note 66.
71. 744 F.2d at 1393.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
75. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
76. 744 F.2d at 1393.
77. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). See supra note 33.
78. 744 F.2d at 1393. The Tenth Circuit further stated that the medical nature of
using antipsychotic drugs was not reason enough to dispose of procedural due process
requirements. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,430 (1979)). While the Court
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Bee also contended that a third source of constitutional protection
stems from the first amendment. 79 The court, agreeing with Bee, rea-
soned that antipsychotic drugs, because of their ability to severely im-
pair an individual's thought processes and abilities to communicate,
infringe upon the right to free speech and free thought. According to
the court, this infringement implicates first amendment interests.80
The combination of these privacy, liberty and freedom of thought
interests lead the court to hold that Bee retained a constitutional inter-
est in refusing Thorazine treatments. However, the court qualified this
interest as "not absolute," 8' stating that such interests are subject to
"'the demands of an organized society.' "82 The court then weighed
Bee's liberty interests against the legitimate interests of the state.
Following Bell v. Wolfish, 8 3 the court stated that pretrial detainees, as
lawfully incarcerated individuals, lose certain rights otherwise enjoyed
by free people. 84 The court expressly adopted the Bell professional
judgment standard8 5 - even relating to the first amendment protec-
tions afforded Bee - as the level of review the courts must use when
examining the policies and actions of prison officials.8 6
The court then examined each of the defendant-appellees' alleged
overriding governmental interests.8 7 The defendants first claimed a
constitutional duty to medically treat pretrial detainees. This argument
was dismissed outright as perverting the holding of Bell;8 8 the duty is
only applicable when the treatment not provided is desired and re-
quested by the pretrial detainee. 89 Second, the defendants asserted
their duty to maintain a pretrial detainee's competency to stand trial.
This defense was also summarily dismissed by the court on the basis that
the state court had found Bee competent to stand trial prior to the epi-
sode of forced medication. 90
defers to reasonably related professional judgment when addressing substantive due pro-
cess requirements, it is much more demanding when procedural due process requirements
are involved. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
79. 744 F.2d at 1393-94.
80. Id. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 927-29.
81. 744 F.2d at 1394.
82. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 320).
83. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
84. 744 F.2d at 1394.
85. Id. This standard involves a substantial amount of deference to prison administra-
tors. See supra text accompanying note 57.
86. 744 F.2d at 1394-95.
87. Id. at 1395.
88. Id. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. The court distinguished two cases which held that,
because detainees were entitled to medical treatment, the state has a duty to provide such
care. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub noma. Ledbetter v.Jones,
452 U.S. 959 (1981); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). According to the
Tenth Circuit, this obligation is conditioned upon the request of the inmate himself. 744
F.2d at 1395.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Tenth Circuit did not have to go further on this point, yet it chose to
develop the issue in detail, in dicta. The court doubted that there ever could exist a "suffi-
ciently compelling" state interest in bringing an individual to trial strong enough to out-
weigh an accused's interest in not being forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. Id.
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The third and final state interest asserted by the defendants was the
interest involved in protecting the inmates and staff from the actions of a
violent detainee. Adopting the Bell "reasonable relation" standard, the
court held that absent an emergency situation, forced medication is un-
constitutional. 9 ' What, precisely, constitutes an "emergency situation"
turns on the relevant circumstances present in each case. 92 As a final
consideration for the district court on remand, the Tenth Circuit stated
that even if an emergency existed at the time Bee was forcibly injected,
such medication might still be unconstitutional.9 3 The court held that




A. Legitimacy of the Court's Bases For Constitutional Protection
1. Bee's Liberty Interest Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Traditionally, areas which call for substantive due process protec-
tions are marriage, education, free travel and procreation. 9 5 However,
as Justice Harlan pointed out in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, due process
cannot be "reduced to any formula."'9 6 The soundness of a court's deci-
sion regarding liberty interests will be evaluated through the test of
time, contended Harlan. 9 7 Certainly, the Supreme Court has made a
highly subjective practice of determining the specific areas deserving of
substantive due process protection.
Against this background, the Tenth Circuit validly held that Bee was
entitled to due process protection. In other words, Bee possessed a lib-
erty interest under the fourteenth amendment. The first type of protec-
tion afforded Bee is his right to informed consent. This right extends to
persons within a state's custody who are deprived of certain rights en-
joyed by free persons. 98 In light of the recent opinions in Rennie I and
Rogers,9 9 Bee, under the circumstances of this case, possessed a clear
constitutional right to refuse treatment. The second type of liberty pro-
tection recognized by the court was liberty from bodily restraint. There
is little doubt following the Supreme Court's ruling in Youngberg v. Ro-
91. Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).
92. 744 F.2d at 1396. Whether or not the circumstances in Bee made it an "emer-
gency" situation was a material factual issue in dispute, for determination on remand. An-
other issue of fact to be determined on remand was whether or not forcible medication for
an indefinite period constituted an exaggerated response. d. at 1396-97.
93. Id. at 1395-96.
94. Id. The court suggested that "tranquilizers or sedatives" might have been tried
first instead of the more powerful antipsychotic medication. In a footnote, the court ac-
knowledged some dispute regarding the use of the less intrusive means analysis in cases
involving the involuntary treatment of the mentally infirm. Id. at 1396 n.7. See infra notes
135-41 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
96. 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 16.
97. 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 929.
99. See Rennie 1, 653 F.2d 836, supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text; Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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meo, 0 0 that even convicted prisoners retain certain freedoms from bod-
ily restraint.' 0 ' In Youngberg, however, the Court did not address the
possibility of mental restraints, as only physical bondage was at issue.
The court in Bee relied on an analogy initially drawn in Project Release v.
Prevost 102 to locate a liberty interest within the freedom from mental
restraint. "Forcible medication can alter mental processes and limit
physical movement and therefore is analogous to bodily restraint."'
10 3
Thus, the Tenth Circuit stood on firm ground when it found that Bee
possessed liberty interests under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The holding is less solid, however, regarding the
court's ruling that Bee possessed a special liberty interest protection
based upon the right to privacy.
2. Bee's Right to Privacy
Relying on Roe v. Wade, 104 the Tenth Circuit found that Bee pos-
sessed a "fundamental" right to privacy. 10 5 As noted previously, the
concept of protection embodied in the phrase "right to privacy" only
appears in Supreme Court decisions relating to specific factual situa-
tions. 10 6 Further, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find a right
of privacy outside the traditional right-to-privacy contexts of marriage,
education, travel and procreation.' 0 7 Thus, it is unclear whether the
Tenth Circuit's extension of the right-to-privacy beyond the prescribed
boundaries will be adopted by the Supreme Court in the future, as a part
of some general personal right to privacy.
3. The Use of the First Amendment
First amendment protections have long held a position of special
importance with the Supreme Court. Justices writing on behalf of the
Court have often called for the highest level of judicial scrutiny when
reviewing first amendment issues. 10 8 In Rogers v. Okin, 10 9 the First Cir-
100. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
101. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
102. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 1309.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
106. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 20. The Tenth Circuit found support for Bee's right to privacy in
the -important decisions" interest outlined in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), supra
note 20. While Whalen appears to recognize a right to privacy which is general in nature
and not dependent upon specific contexts for its existence, it is unclear from the holding
whether the Court extended the right to privacy beyond the traditional zones of protec-
tion. In fact, the Court held that the specific relationship in question was not protected by
the right to privacy and that "important decisions" are characterized as dealing with "mat-
ters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rear-
ing and education." 429 U.S. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976)).
108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984). See supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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cuit upheld the portion of the trial court's opinion which grounded the
right to refuse treatment on the first amendment. The court thus gave
tacit approval to using first amendment protection for mental patients
forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs."10 Therefore, assuming
Bee is entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as mental
health. patients, the Tenth Circuit had at least one source of authority for
finding first amendment protection for Bee."I ' However, although the
first amendment provides a high level of protection, it is not absolute.
Compelling state interests such as attempts to rehabilitate mental pa-
tients may override this protection, allowing involuntary treatment of
mental health patients in certain situations. 
1 2
B. The Level of Protection Afforded Bee as a Pretrial Detainee and Mental
Patient
None of these liberty interests, including those derived from the
first amendment, is afforded absolute protection. Any liberty interest to
which pretrial detainees are entitled must be weighed against compel-
ling, possibly subordinating state interests. Before this "balancing" of
competing interest occurs, it is necessary to determine the level of pro-
tection pretrial detainees in Bee's position are due. The Tenth Circuit
looked to Bell v. Wofish "i for guidance as to the level of protection ap-
plicable to pretrial detainees. Under Bell, while not permitted the pro-
tections of a free person, Bee, as a pretrial detainee, retained
fundamental fights at least as extensive as those of convicted prison-
ers." 14 Although the Tenth Circuit concluded under the Bell test that,
absent an emergency, the governmental activities in Bee were not rea-
sonably related to legitimate state interests, the court never recognized
the fact that in Bell no fundamental rights were involved. '1 5 It is unclear
whether the Tenth Circuit merely overlooked this distinction or whether
the court determined that the presence of a fundamental right would
not change the "reasonable relationship" standard.
Another distinguishing trait of pretrial detainees is their presump-
tion of innocence, a factor which might cause a court to treat them in a
manner similar to free persons. However, the Court in Bell gave no
weight to this consideration when determining the rights of pretrial de-
tainees. 1 16 Nor did the Tenth Circuit mention the issue in Bee.
110. "The First Amendment protects the communication of ideas. That protected
right of communication presupposes a capacity to produce ideas. . . .Whatever powers
the Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind control is not one of
them, absent extraordinary circumstances." Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
111. But see infra text accompanying notes 117-119.
112. As long as a mental patient is given due process procedures, he may also bejudi-
cially submitted to treatment. See Comment, The First Amendment Right to Freedom of
Thought as Applied to Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Drugs, 26 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 973 (1982).
113. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
114. Id. at 545. See supra text accompanying note 50.
115. 441 U.S. at 539.
116. "Without question, the presumption of innocence plays an important role in our
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Further, in determining the appropriate level of protection, the
Tenth Circuit declined to view Bee as a mental patient. In light of Bee's
mental health history, the court might have viewed him as a mental pa-
tient, in addition to a pretrial detainee. As set forth in Youngberg v. Ro-
me'o,11 7 although an involuntarily committed individual necessarily loses
certain rights, a mental health patient also retains certain fundamental
protections.1 8 The Bee court could have strengthened its analysis re-
garding the level of Bee's constitutional protection by defining Bee as a
mental health patient in addition to a pretrial detainee. 1 9 The court in
Bee reached the correct level of protection for Bee, but overlooked an
important consideration.
C. State Interests and Levels of Review
1. Duty to Treat Medical Needs of Patients
The defendants in Bee initially argued that the jail is under a consti-
tutional duty to "treat the medical needs of pretrial detainees."120 The
Tenth Circuit disposed of this assertion as a misstatement of law. Con-
trary to the interpretation offered by the defendants, a jail's duty to
medically or psychologically treat its inmates is purely conditional upon
the request and desire of the inmates themselves. 12 1 Further, to hold
that the state has a right to forcibly treat detainees at will, regardless of
any standard as to legitimacy in the government's objectives, is to com-
pletely disregard all that Bell stands for. 122 Thus, the court in Bee right-
fully rejected this attempt by the defendants to allege a legitimate state
concern which simply does not exist. However, the other two state in-
terests set forth were legally 'sound, whether or not applicable to the
context of Bee.
2. Maintaining Bee's Competency to Stand Trial
Based upon Jackson v. Indiana,123 there is a legitimate state interest,
validly identified by the court in Bee, to bring the accused to trial in a
criminal justice system. . . . But it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun." Id. at 533.
117. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
118. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
119. Bee spent a substantial amount of time in the Salt Lake mental health facility.
Moreover, he was treated by two state employed psychiatrists. Arguably, Bee could have
been considered a mental health patient. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
120. 744 F.2d at 1395.
121. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
123. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Supreme Court found that a state has a lim-
ited right to commit incompetent criminally accused persons for a period of time, without
a due process hearing. The detainee may be held "only for a 'reasonable period of time'
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to
stand trial in the foreseeable future." Id. at 733. See also Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp.
822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (where an unconvicted person is confined in federal custody and
where it is clear that lack of competency to stand trial is permanent or has existed for an
unreasonable period of time and there is not likely to be an immediate change, such per-
son should be ultimately transferred to state authorities for adequate control and
treatment).
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state of mental competency. However, nothing in Jackson defines this
state interest as "compelling." On the contrary, the Supreme Court in
Jackson severely restrained a state's attempts to detain a criminal defend-
ant for an indeterminate time or "until sane." 124 The court in Bee
reached the appropriate conclusion underJackson, but did not mention
the case, nor call upon the above standards. The court chose instead to
question whether a state interest in bringing a competent defendant to
trial is ever "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh all of the aforemen-
tioned liberty interests. 125 Thus, while failing to cite any helpful author-
ity to justify its position, the court in Bee was accurate in doubting that
the interest in bringing a competent defendant to trial could ever be
compelling enough to outweigh that defendant's numerous liberty inter-
ests against involuntary medication.
126
However, this discussion is mere speculation on dicta, as the Tenth
Circuit, relying on the lower court's finding that Bee was competent to
stand trial, stated that the issue of Bee's competency is "not implicated
in this case." 127 There is a strong inference in the record that when the
Utah court found Bee competent to stand trial, Bee was under the influ-
ence of Thorazine.' 2 8 In fact, the state psychiatrists who treated Bee
were of the opinion that Bee would require continued Thorazine treat-
ment to maintain his competency to stand trial. 129 A constant dosage of
Thorazine would have a tremendous impact, not only on Bee's compe-
tency to stand trial, but also on his general demeanor as a witness.
3 0
Thus, there is at least a strong implication within the facts of Bee that
Bee's competency was artificially controlled, and that his competency to
stand trial was a direct product of the effects of an extremely potent
tranquilizer. Apparently this was completely overlooked by the Tenth
Circuit judges who relied upon the federal district court's reliance upon
the state court's finding that Bee was competent to stand trial.
13 '
124. If the defendant does not attain a status of competency in a reasonable period of
time, the state must either release the defendant or "institute the customary civil commit-
ment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen." Jackson,
406 U.S. at 738. See also Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post- Jackson Analysis,
40 TENN. L. REV. 659 (1973).
125. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395. The court might have strengthened its position by drawing
an analogy toJackson. If a state is prevented from retaining in its custody a legally incom-
petent defendant beyond a reasonable amount of time, then it follows that a state may not
attempt to keep a person competent through the harsher liberty violation of forced
medication.
126. This is particularly true since first amendment protections are implicated. Only
"sufficiently compelling" state interests may override first amendment protections. See
supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
127. 744 F.2d at 1395.
128. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 8.
130. See supra notes I and 10 and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. at 927 ("Though there appears to be no generally accepted theory that explains the
biochemical manner in which the drugs work, the beneficial effects of antipsychotic drugs
are on thought processes and the brain's ability to sort out and integrate perceptions and
memory. That is, they stabilize and blunt thought processes.").
131. While not an issue in Bee, the possibility of conviction while under the influence of
Thorazine would involve the question of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. See
Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959) (motion to vacate sentence of con-
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3. Jail Security and the "Emergency" Standard
Both Bee and the defendants agreed that forced medication with
psychotropic drugs may be required in an "emergency." 13 2 The Tenth
Circuit, in remanding the issue to the trial court for a ruling on whether
an emergency existed, outlined the "reasonable relation" test of
Youngberg v. Romeo. '33 The court provided that the decision of what con-
stitutes an emergency is to be decided on a case by case basis with defer-
ence to the "professional judgment" of medical authorities.
134
However, in listing the considerations to be analyzed in determining on
remand whether an emergency existed,' 3 5 the court in Bee departed
from the Youngberg standard and seems to authorize the much higher
level of judicial review inferred in the "less intrusive means" stan-
dard.' 3 6 The court attempted to justify its deviance from the traditional
standard by arguing that Youngberg is distinguishable as it does not con-
template the "severe effects" of antipsychotic drugs.' 3 7 Although it is
well-established that the side-effects of Thorazine and other psycho-
tropic medications are severe and more permanent than other forms of
restraint, 138 the Supreme Court, in Rennie J,139 had the opportunity to
change the level of review pertaining to cases specifically involving
forced medication with antipsychotic drugs. Yet, the Court elected to
maintain the Youngberg "professional judgment" standard. As set forth
in the Third Circuit's opinion on remand, 140 the
Supreme Court thus declined to adopt a "least intrusive
means" analysis, and remanded both Rennie, [citations omitted]
and Rogers v. Okin [citations omitted] to their respective courts.
Mills involved the same issue as Rennie, namely, the constitu-
tionality of the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to
involuntarily committed mental patients. Rennie was remanded
specifically for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Youngberg.14
Thus, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped the Supreme Court's tacit rul-
victed felon remanded for further consideration where defendant was incapacitated at time
of trial due to the influence of narcotics); State v. Hancock, 426 P.2d 872 (Or. 1967) (crim-
inal conviction affirmed because tranquilizers given to defendant did not deprive him of
the ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and to assist in his own defense);
State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960) (new trial granted for defendant convicted of
murder; defendant's attitude, appearance, and demeanor may have been influenced by
tranquilizers during trial). For an in-depth treatment of this issue as it applies to psycho-
tropic drugs, see Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 Asx. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 769.
132. 744 F.2d at 1395.
133. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
134. 744 F.2d at 1396.
135. The considerations included the "nature and gravity of the safety threat, the char-
acteristics of the individual involved, and the likely effects of particular drugs." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. n.7.
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
140. Rennie 11, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 268.
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ing that cases involving psychotropic medications should be evaluated
according to the Youngberg "professional judgment" standard. In its ef-
forts to provide a high degree of protection for Bee and others sub-
jected to similar treatment, the Tenth Circuit appears to have exceeded
the limitations on individual liberty interests, necessarily imposed by
competing legitimate state objectives, as proscribed by the Supreme
Court.
CONCLUSION
Bee v. Greaves straddles the law of several Supreme Court decisions.
Bee was a pretrial detainee who was subjected to forced medication with
a potentially dangerous drug. While the holding reached by the Tenth
Circuit is accurate, several important points were overlooked by the
court. The court ignored the possibility that without Thorazine, Bee
may not have been competent to stand trial, a factor which would have
been evident to the state court at his competency hearing. At that point,
Bee would have undergone civil commitment. Similarly, the court
should have considered Bee to be a mental patient as well as a pretrial
detainee. Finally, in its "less intrusive means" language, the court ap-
pears to stray from the traditional standard of review attributed to cases
of this nature. The holding in Bee is otherwise reasonable, affording per-
sons like Bee numerous constitutional protections, while allowing room
for subordinating state interests. Absent a clear showing of an emer-
gency situation, Bee, and those like him in future decisions, will be ade-
quately shielded by the Constitution from incidents of forced
medication with antipsychotic drugs.
Solomon L. Leftin
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